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Zusammenfassung
We investigate the impact of an exogenous environment on the emergence of social
herding of consumer sentiment. Collective consumer sentiment is modeled as a large
Ising field with nearest-neighbor interactions on a (two-dimensional) square lattice.
The individual states are called optimism and pessimism. The environment is modeled
as a sequence of exogenous events (external influences), stochastically fluctuating over
time. The exogenous events can be frequent or rare, have a lasting impact or a non-
lasting impact. The field of events is not homogeneous, as individual actors might fail to
perceive events. We use two notions of social herding in our model: permanent herding
refers to an ordered state (i.e. a state with an overwhelming majority of optimists or
pessimists) which persists over an infinite time horizon, while temporary herding refers
to a state in which ordered states appear, persist for some time and decay. The para-
meter of the inter-agent interaction strength is such as to engender permanent herding
without the influence of the environment. To investigate the impact of an environment
we determine whether an initially ordered state decays for the two cases that positive
and negative events have both the same empirical frequencies and strengths (i.e. the
environment is “neutral”in the long term) and that the latter property does not hold.
In the neutral case we find temporary herding if events are sufficiently “strong” and/or
perceived by a sufficiently large proportion of agents, and our results suggest that per-
manent herding occurs for small values of the parameters. In the “non-neutral” we find
temporary herding, but we have not tested whether permanent herding occurs.
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1 Introduction
Recently, there has been renewed strong interest among scholars of Economics in the impact
of consumer sentiment – a vague concept operationalized in particular surveys as a bundle of
expectations and assessments of the consumer about the economic prospects – on individual
and aggregate economic activity [12, 29, 38]. While economic sentiment has been considered
as a relevant indicator among practitioners of economic policy [23], as well as often underlying
arguments made in the media, economic modeling is primarily concerned with other, more
definite types of expectations (such as income and price expectations for a given point in
time), and there is much less agreement among theorists in what way – if at all – the concept
of economic sentiment should enter economic modeling.
The basic assumption of the present paper is that economic sentiment is prone to social
influence, in that, say, a consumer is more likely than not to hold an optimistic (pessimi-
stic) expectation about the economic prospects if his peers do. Indeed, according to Social
Psychology, an individual is the more likely to conform with the judgment of others the less
the individual who has to form the judgment (in our case an expectation about economic
prospects) is in a position to do so in a rational and informed manner [1, 2, 14]. But as ex-
perimental studies in the human perception of complex dynamic systems suggest [18, 39] (as
does common sense), a typical consumer has only a limited perception about the functioning
of the economy, and the political system in which it is embedded, given their complexity
(arguably, this limitation applies to a considerable extent even for specialists). Therefore,
it appears natural to conclude that formation of economic sentiment is prone to social in-
fluence, which then might or might not result in herding of economic sentiment in a large
population of consumers.
The general phenomenon of social herding has attracted much interest in economic theory
over the last two decades, in particular in the wake of disturbances on financial markets (see
[3, 5, 28, 31, 7] for some seminal contributions, each of them having inspired many others),
and we shall start by relating our model to the existing literature. A useful distinction of
the existing literature on herding is as to whether individual behavior is modeled according
to the principles of economic rationality; the first two of the above cited papers do so. Our
paper does not, as it is based on the statistical modeling approach1 which directly applies to
1 See [17, 34, 20] for the first formulations of the statistical modeling approach in Economics and Sociology
and the Appendix to this paper for a short discussion.
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sentiment formation the empirical evidence about social comparison processes presented and
discussed, for instance, in [1, 2, 14] rather than explaining economic sentiment formation from
rationality principles. The statistical modeling approach turns away from dealing with the
presumably complex cognitive processes of economic sentiment formation focusing instead on
macroscopic coordination outcomes, given the empirical findings at the individual-level. But
it is for the following reason, that (provided that individual-level empirical knowledge exists)
we believe that for modeling the dynamics of consumer sentiment in large populations such an
approach is more appropriate than the principle of individual economic rationality: Consumer
sentiment, if considered as a particular instance, or at least part, of a consumer’smental model
[9, 36], is a premise of individual reasoning and decision-making rather than the subject of
it. In latter respect, our paper is related to [31], as chartism and fundamentalism can be
interpreted as instances of mental models.2 In applying the statistical modeling approach,
our paper is related, besides [17, 34, 20], to [28, 31, 7]. It is most closely related to an emerging
strain of the literature on socially-driven economic sentiment formation [16, 24, 13, 40, 41].
The particular aim of this paper is to analyze the interplay of social (local) interacti-
ons and environmental (global) influences on the emergence of coordination states in an
Ising-type model of collective consumer sentiment. It is a rather trivial observation that, for
instance, economic traders react as much to the news coming from the broader geo-political
environment – whether or not these news are objectively interpreted – as to the behavi-
or/advice of others. (Relatedly, there has been much interest recently in a more general issue
of disentangling endogenous and exogenous dynamics in complex systems [10, 37].) Though
the environment does have an impact in existing models of financial herding, for instance in
chartist-fundamentalists models [31] as changes in the fundamental value, or as news affec-
ting traders [32], our model – due to its simple abstract structure – is apt to analyze that
interplay in an abstract way.3
We investigate the impact of an exogenous environment on the emergence of social herding
of consumer sentiment. Collective consumer sentiment is modeled as a large Ising field with
2The distinction between actions and some mental parameters affecting decision-making leading to actions
might appear artificial in our paper, as, at a formal level, the variables of the Ising model are open to any
interpretation. However, the distinction becomes clear, once the basic model is extended by some decision
procedure determined by the mental parameters. Then the actions of agents emerge from some deliberate
mental plan of the individual, while imitative social forces act on a “deeper” level.
3 In socio-economic applications of the Ising model, an external environment has been previously consi-
dered by [21, 20, 25].
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nearest-neighbor interactions on a (two-dimensional) square lattice. The individual states are
called optimism and pessimism. The environment is modeled as a a sequence of exogenous
events (external influences), stochastically fluctuating over time. The exogenous events can
be frequent or rare, have a lasting impact or a non-lasting impact. The field of events is not
homogeneous, as individual actors might fail to perceive events.
We introduce two notions of social herding in our model: permanent herding, the stronger
notion, refers to an ordered state (i.e. a state with an overwhelming majority of optimists
or pessimists) which persists over an infinite time horizon, while temporary herding refers
to a state in which ordered states appear, persist for some time and decay. The parameter
of the inter-agent interaction strength in the underlying Ising field is such as to engender a
persistent ordered phase of the infinite model (permanent herding in our terminology) without
the influence of the environment. To investigate the impact of an environment we determine
whether an initially ordered state decays for the two cases that positive and negative events
have both the same empirical frequencies and strengths (i.e. the environment is “neutral”in
the long term) and that the latter property does not hold. In the neutral case we find
temporary herding if events are sufficiently “strong” and/or perceived by a sufficiently large
proportion of agents, and our results suggest that permanent herding occurs for small values
of the parameters. In the “non-neutral” we find temporary herding, but we have not tested
whether permanent herding occurs.
We abstain in the present paper from explicitly modeling the link to real economic va-
riables and instead concentrate on the interplay of endogenous and exogenous influences on
consumer sentiment (but we do so also because the way to model such a link is not obvious,




We let the Ising model on a two-dimensional square lattice with nearest-neighbor interactions
represent socially-driven collective states of economic sentiment4 (see the Appendix for a
short summary of the statistical modeling approach, and of the Ising model in particular,
in the context of economic modeling). The variable xi denotes the economic sentiment of
agent i. Individual states xi = −1 and xi = 1 represent the individual states of pessimism
and optimism, respectively. It is well-known that for interactions between agents stronger
than some critical value Jc (letting aside any external influences) there exist on the infinite
lattice two phases of the sentiment field (“coordination states”), with the economic actors in
each of them being either predominantly pessimistic or predominantly optimistic [11]. These
phases are stable states which emerge – in an appropriate sense – already in a large enough
finite system [26] (permanent herding in our terminology).
The events affecting consumer sentiment (“the environment”) at a given point in time
are modeled in the present paper as realizations of a random variable B with the possible
values B = b (“positive” event), or B = −b (“negative” event), or B = 0 (no event). We
assume an agent perceives the event correctly with probability p, while ignoring the event
with probability 1 − p. Perception of an event is independent among agents. We introduce
a variable ǫi, such that ǫi = 1 represents the situation that agent i perceives the event and
ǫi = 0 otherwise.
According to principles of statistical modeling (see the Appendix to our paper), the
following interaction potential5 appropriately characterizes the interaction structure of our










4We must point out the limitations of our basic model: first, the topology of social interactions is hardly
as simple as a square lattice, yet we are not aware of empirical investigations on network structures for our
type of interactions, while network structures found in other types of social interactions (see e.g. [4]) may
not apply to our context [35]. Second, interactions need not be symmetrical with respect to the individuals
involved, as is the case in our model. Third, the individual states of economic sentiment should be more rich,
possibly even continuous. However, we do believe that the Ising model provides a first-approximation to the
type of systems we aim to analyze.
5 In Physics, Eq. 1 has the interpretation of energy, and the sum of individual energy contributions is
called Hamiltonian. In Social Sciences, we do not have a quantity corresponding to energy, such that Eq. 1
is merely representation of empirical regularities, see the Appendix for details.
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with periodic boundary conditions being specified in our simulations. The strictly positive
parameter J characterizes the interaction-to-noise ratio. The first sum accounts for local
interaction between individual agents, while the second accounts for the impact of the exo-
genous events.
In Monte-Carlo Statistical Physics equilibrium states are obtained from an appropriate
algorithm (which might be interpreted as a stochastic dynamics of the system), whereby indi-
vidual sites are sequentially updated according to the probabilities proportional to exp(−H),
using the prevailing configuration of next-neighbors.
We consider the following specifications of the process Bt representing the environment
(see Figure 1): external events can be frequent (time scales of the Ising field and the external
field are comparable) (top), lasting but rare, (e.g. the environment may change from b to
−b or vice versa only once in T updates of all individual variables) and rare transitory
(shocks, see Figure 1 bottom). Positive and negative events/shocks prevail equally frequent
(on average).
3 Results
Figure 2 summarizes our simulation results on the persistence of an initial ordered state
of the consumer sentiment field for the case of a large system and a neutral environment.
The curves in Figure 2 separate areas of the parameter space – the parameters being the
proportion p of agents perceiving the event6 and event “strength” b – for which the initial
ordered state persists over 4000 Monte Carlo time steps (these areas are below a curve), and
in which the initial ordered states do not survive over 4000 MCTS (these areas are above
a curve). For a fixed b, the proportion p was diminished until for half of the four simulated
samples no change from the initial optimistic majority to a slight majority of pessimists was
observed during 4000 iterations (sweeps through the lattice). This border point then was put
into Fig.2.
As 4000 is a somewhat arbitrary time scale, we also investigated stability of an initial
ordered state over very long horizons for frequent news and Jc/J = 0.9. Figure 3 depicts
the dependence on p of the median time at which the ordered state is destroyed for a fixed
exemplary value b = 1. It turns out that this time tends to infinity for p ≃ 0.16, close to
the corresponding p ≃ 0.20 for 4000 iterations in Figure 2. This suggests that there is an
6Clearly, for large enough systems this fraction equals the probability p of an agent perceiving the event.
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area of the parameter space (presumably separated by a curve running slightly below the
curve in Fig. 2) for which an ordered state is stable over infinite time horizons for a very
large lattice. In this case, the environment does not have a destructive impact on collective
consumer sentiment.
What are the properties of the model for parameters b and p above a curve in Fig. 2?
The inspection of figures displaying time-paths of the proportion of optimists/pessimists
for parameter values above a curve in Fig. 2 (available from the authors on request) shows
that the typical time-path above a curve in Figure 2 is irregular: Periods of pessimisms
emerge, persist for some time and decay, as do periods of optimism. Periods of optimism and
pessimism are equally frequent over time.
These results motivate two notions of social herding in our model: permanent herding,
the stronger notion, refers to an ordered state (i.e. a state with an overwhelming majority
of optimists or pessimists) which persists over an infinite time horizon, while temporary her-
ding refers to a state in which ordered states appear, persist for some time and decay. (Note
that the parameter of the inter-agent interaction strength in the underlying Ising field is
such as to engender a persistent ordered phase of the infinite model – permanent herding in
our terminology – without the influence of the environment.) Thus, for the neutral environ-
ment, our results strongly suggest that permanently stable ordered states of collective pessi-
mism/optimism do not occur if events are too strong and/or are considered by a sufficiently
large proportion of agents. This is due to a “competition” between the social mechanism
tending to produce coordination, and the disorder of the external environment. Given that
positive and negative events have equal empirical frequencies, such that the environment
is “neutral” with respect to sentiment, it is quite intuitive that a widespread perception of
external events destroys endogenous collective states: the disorder of the environment then
prevails over the tendency to herding in economic sentiment.
We also considered an environment which is biased in favor of pessimism. We take the
strength of negative event as −2b, i.e. twice as strong as the positive event b. Analogously
to Fig. 2, the curves in Figure 4 separate areas of the parameter space in which the initial
ordered state persists for a simulation length of 4000 Monte Carlo time steps (these areas
are below a curve), and in which the initial ordered states does not survive over 4000 MCTS
(these areas are above a curve). Fig.4 shows that the b or p values required for this transition
are now drastically smaller than for the neutral environments in Fig.2. This might suggest
the absence of permanently stable ordered states, but we did not perform for the biased
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environment long-time simulations analogous to those presented in Fig. 3.
4 Discussion
States of “collective pessimism” – if this social phenomenon indeed occurs – might be detri-
mental to the efficiency of allocation of economic resources. Indeed, “explanations” to that
effect can often be heard in the public discussion about the state of the economy and eco-
nomic policy. We believe that economic-sentiment-based arguments are relevant despite the
lack of proper theoretical foundations, and the present paper is an exploratory step toward
formulating relevant models. Our basic result has a clear economic intuition: attendance to
news reduces the prevalence of collective economic sentiment. This result appears to suggest
that our model might be a useful starting point, though the present paper does not cover
several important issues. In particular, the role of the graph structure of the underlying
network should be investigated. Also, we have not specified the actual “transmission mecha-
nism” of economic sentiment into economic variables necessary for a welfare analysis of the
impact of collective economic sentiment.
A more general problem lies in the fact that what we called environment is only in
part exogenous, as the economy itself produces relevant news which are interpreted by the
decision-makers – but not necessarily in a correct way. For instance, prolonged investor pessi-
mism might lead to a reduction of GDP, which in turn negatively affects investor sentiment.
Such collective expectational biases turning real economic forces have been qualitatively
described by Keynes [27], but are largely neglected in modern macroeconomic theory. (In
contrast, recent modeling of financial markets does incorporate expectational biases (see
[30, 31] for seminal contributions to this research direction). The present model does not
include a feedback from real macro-variables (“endogenous environment”) to the economic
sentiment (see [41] for an attempt in this direction) as we do not specify a link of economic
sentiment to real variables.
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Appendix: An introduction to the concept of Statistical Economics
Consider the situation that a variable xi representing an economically-relevant attribute of
the individual i (for instance, her assessment of some issue affecting her investment decision)
is socially influenced, or, formally, that xi depends on the attributes (xj)j∈R(i) of other indivi-
duals in her reference group R(i) (this is the situation often considered in social psychology,
see e.g. [1, 2, 14]). For simplicity we assume that only two attribute realizations, common to
all individuals, are possible. Assume that many independent observations of the individual in
her social context (or of a population of, for our purposes, equivalent individuals with their
social contexts) yield strictly positive empirical frequencies rxR(i) of her attribute realizations
for any given configuration xR(i) = (xj)j∈R(i) of attributes in her reference group, which are
denoted by
rxR(i)(xi) = h(xi, xR(i)).
We introduce a stochastic model of our experiment by defining a random variable Xi
such that
Pr[Xi = xi|XR(i) = xR(i)] = h(xi, xR(i)) ∀xi, ∀xR(i). (2)
The stochastic representation is an adequate model of our socially-influenced individual i
in the statistical sense, that is to say, a family of independent variables with the above
specified distribution, reproducing the empirical frequencies correctly in large samples. Let
us moreover assume that we can find a strictly positive real number J such that







where δxy denotes the Kronecker function (δxy = 1 for x = y and δxy = 0 otherwise), and





j∈R(i) δxixj ). The argument of the
exponential function is a simple instance of an interaction potential.7 8
7 The interaction potential in Eq. 3 is equivalent (as far as the resulting macro-states are concerned) to
the Ising model (Eq. 1 for B = 0), while it formally allows for a non-numerical individual state space.
8 While the specification of the interaction potential in Eq. 3 is quite particular, we note that the general
approach behind Eq. 3 is sufficiently general. In fact, any distribution of any family of finite-valued inter-
dependent random variables has a representation by interaction potentials (Clifford-Hammersley Theorem).
For the infinite case, such equivalence holds if the interdependence of variables is “sufficiently local” (see [22]
for a thorough treatment of these issues).
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In the presently considered socio-economic context, the right-hand-side of the above equa-
tion is nothing more than a specific quantitative representation of the feature that the pro-
bability of individual i being observed with some attribute realization increases with each
agent in the reference group having the same attribute realization. In the situation that em-
pirical knowledge suggests such a functional dependence, we might avail of an explanatory
theory of why such a dependence occurs, and possibly a model at the cognitive level, but
it will be difficult to ascertain whether any of them is correct. Certainly, we do not know
what parameters are responsible for any individual-level observation. But, in fact, we need
not always a micro-level theory. The main point of he statistical modeling approach is that
such an empirically-based description at the micro-level is sufficient to analyze macroscopic
coordination outcomes in large populations of agents displaying such a behavior.
Let us consider a large population A of agents with a structure of overlapping reference
groups, which is represented by a graph structure imposed on A. For illustration let us
consider the two-dimensional square lattice. The set of nodes is denoted by Z2 and the
reference group is defined by R(i) = {j ∈ Z2 : ||i−j|| = 1} where || · || denotes the Euclidean
metric on R2. Since the micro-level behavior is exogenous, the point of inquiry would now
be what are the macroscopic properties of a variable field (Xi)i∈Λ, with the conditional
distributions prescribed by Eq. 3, for large volumes Λ ⊂ Z2 – or even more appropriately
– for the infinite lattice, if such fields indeed exist. The answer is that they do exist, but
they need not be unique in the infinite lattice case. It is well-known [11, 33] that there exists
a critical value Jc such that for parameter values J > Jc there appear two (lattice-shift)
ergodic distributions of the infinite Ising field (for lattice dimension two and more). These
states correspond to coordination outcomes: either an optimist fraction mo(J) ≃ 1 or a
pessimist fraction mp(J) ≃ 1 permanently prevails. In contrast, for J < Jc, no coordination
occurs, i.e. the distribution is unique with mp(J) = mo(J) = 0.5 (despite the exogenous
tendency of each agent to conform with the attributes of the reference group).
The statistical modeling approach has been very successfully applied for the analysis of
the collective behavior of systems in Physics, and has a long tradition in Sociology (in parti-
cular, Schelling [34] published in 1971 a now classical [15] sociological simulation, which used
a model similar to the Ising model; further seminal contributions include [21, 20]). It is not
comparably widespread in Economics, though important contributions exist (e.g. [17, 7]). It
is important to stress that the methodological analogy between the Natural Sciences and
Economics in no way implies a conclusion of the sort that the statistical modeling approach
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in Economics amounts to “agents behaving like particles” (i.e. not actively reasoning and
making decisions). This view would presumably stem from misinterpreting stochastic mode-
ling of individual-level regularities as representing causal rather than statistical regularities.
That is to say, while the statistical approach leaves mental processes by which conclusions
and decisions are obtained unmodeled, it in no way negates or contradicts their existence. In
a similar spirit, live tables describe human survival as a function of age leaving bio-medical
processes unmodeled which cause specific individual deaths.
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Abbildung 1: Time-patterns of the process Bt representing the environment: time scales of
the Ising field and the external field are comparable (top), lasting but rare events (middle)
and rare transitory events (shocks) (bottom). The proportion of positive and negative events
















Abbildung 2: Areas of the parameter space of our model where ordered states persist and do
not persist for a neutral environment for 4000 sweeps through a 3001 x 3001 lattice: ordered
states of collective sentiment exist for vectors of the parameter values below a boundary
curve, but do not exist for vectors of parameter values above; the curves are as follows: (+)
frequent events, Jc/J = 0.99, (×) frequent events, Jc/J = 0.9; (∗) rare persistent events,















Abbildung 3: The dependence on p of the median time at which the ordered state is destroyed
















strengths b and -2b
Abbildung 4: As Figure 2, but for biased (non-neutral) environment. We made 4000 sweeps
for Jc/J = 0.90 (+,x) and 0.99 (*), for frequent events only, for 1001 × 1001 (+) and
3001× 3001 (x,*) lattices. For 1001× 1001 at Jc/J = 0.99 the symbols would overlap with
those for the larger lattice and are thus not shown.
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